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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a decomposition of the decline in union density into
structural and within sector components using CPS data for private sector
workers. We find that 58 to 68 percent of the decline in private sector
unionization between 1973 and 1981 can be accounted for by structural changes
in the economy, particularly in the occupational, educational and gender
distribution of the workforce. This is a large impact, but we fnd that whMe
structural change is important, its importance was not appreciah'y greate
during the 1970s than during previous decades. At the same time, we find that
the decline of private sector unionization within sectors has been pervasive,
accounting for 32 to 42 percent of union decline. As part of thSanalysiswe
find that the decline in union density has been greater in those sectors of
the economy where employment decline has been greater. This fact can help
reconcile previous divergent findings on the importance of structural change.
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Cambridge, MA 02138 Cambridge, MA 02138I.Seven Simple Explanations of the Decline in Unions
The proportion of the workforce that is unionized (union density) has
been falling since the mid-1950s. Recent declines have raised the spectre of
the death of collective bargaining, and provoked questions about the long-term
growth and decline of unionism.
There are a numbe'- of common beliefs that offer simple and plausible
sounding explanations for the decline in the unionized proportion of the work
force during the 1970's:
1) Industry has been moving to the South and the West from the
North-East and North-Central regions. Since the South and West have always
beer relatively anti-union, this geographic shift explains the decline in
unioni zat ion.
2) The U.S. manufacturing sector has been in decline, and that this
sector has always been organized labor's chief stomping ground. The unions
are simply dying out along with their prime habitat.
3) White-collar employment is on the rise. As blue-collar jobs fade
away, so do unions which have never found the key to white-collar
organization.
4) The wcrkforce is becoming more highly educated, and so less desirous
of unions.
5) Women have never welcomed unions. More women in the labor force
means less room for union organization.
6) Blacks have been receptive to unions, but as the black proportion of
the workforce fades, so do unions' hopes.-2-
7) The young don't appreciate the security unions provide to senior
workers, and the workforce has become younger.
Other explanations have been offered in terms of B) increasing managerial
resistance prompted by union-wage premiums, 9) an exogenous change in worker
preferences, 10) a shift in NLRB politics, and 11) relatively slower
employment growth in union plants. We focus on the first seven explanations
here.
Inmanyof these cases, the premise of the argument is correct. The
proportion of the workforce employed in the South and West, outside
manufacturing, and in white-collar jobs is increasing. And indeed, unions
have traditionally been weak in these sectors. At the same time, the female;
white, and highly-educated fractions of the workforce have been increasing.
What each of these arguments presumes is that each type of worker or job
has some normal or equflibriuni level of unionization which tends to remain
unchanged even as the composition of the workforce changes. In practice this
may not be too bad an assumption. As the data in Table 1 show, the proportion
of different labor market groups who are union members varies widely in the
cross-section but little over time. This has led several authors to attempt
to assess the extent to which changes in the composition of the labor force
are responsible for the decline in union density by regressing union
membership on dummy variables for job and personal characteristics to obtain
predicted union density for subclasses of workers. These values are then
multiplied by the change in the percent of each type of worker in the labor
force to obtain a predicted decline in union density. This is then compared
to the actual decline to determine what percent of the total decline was due—3-
to the changes in labor force composition. This approach implies a great deal
of faith in the initial assumption that each worker attribute or job type has
a fixed level of union density associated with it.
Itis also possible that there are important interactions between the
dimensions considered by past authors. Women in production jobs in
manufacturing may have much the same probability of being union members as
males, while women in the service industry may be much less likely than men to
be unionized. Further, while the densities in Table 1 are very stable there
are some substantial changes, and the amount of change differs between groups.
Again, it would not be unreasonable to expect that the same forces which are
causing the manufacturing sector to shrink relative to the service sector may
also be making unions in those industries less viable. If either of these
problems is significant, existing estimates of the role of structural shifts
in the decline in union density may be inaccurate.
This paper examines the appropriateness of the standard method for
discerning the importance of structural change. We find that it has led some
authors to overstate the extent of structural change though not by a great
deal. We conclude that between 1973 and 1981 between 58 and 68 percent of the
total decline in union density in the private sector is due in some sense to
structural change.
The rest of this paper proceeds in five sections. Section II discusses
the current population survey samples used in the analysis. The changing
locus of unionism, and the pervasive nature of union decline are shown in
Section III. Section IV presents our basic framework for decomposing the
impact of structural changes on the percent unionized. The importance of-4-
individual dimensions of structural change are analyzed in Section V. Section
VI presents our main results from a simultaneous structural decomposition. To
shed some light on the extent to which structural change in the late 19705 and
early 1980s was unusually great, Section VII compares our results with those
of other economists for earlier periods, our conclusions are presented in
Section VIII.
U. The Current Population Survey Data
The analysis here is based on union membership reported annually in the
May Current Population Survey (CPS) sample. Our study starts in 1973 because
that is the first year in which the union queston was asked. To augment
sample size and insulate from cyclical variation, we group CPS observations
for the years 1973, 1974 and 1975 (hereafter referred to as Y74), and for
1979, 1980 and 1981 (hereafter Y80). We then compare changes between these
two sets of grouped years in employment and unionization across and within
sectors. In each year the sample is limited to employed people reporting
union status, region, industry, occupation, race, sex, age, and education.
Starting in 1977 the CPS changed the "union" question from "Does
(respondent) belong to a labor union on this job?" to "On this job, is
(respondent) a member of a labor union or of an employee association similar
to a union?" To create a consistent series across time, we had to eliminate
association members from our analysis. in 1970, the BLS reported 2,635,000
association members, 96.7 percent of whom were employed by governments (BLS
Directory 1979, Table 16, p.67). The privately employed remainder were in the—5—
service sector, represented by the National Education Association (private
schools), the American Nurses Association, and the National Federation of
Licensed Practical Nurses. Since the union-like associations are found in the
professional service and government sectors, we eliminated these sectors from
our analysis.
While this does result in a more consistent series of unionization data
over time, it will overstate the decline in uniorHzaton over-all becse
these association-rich sectors are precisely the ones in which the incidence
of collective bargaining has been increasing. The union movement is far-frorr
dead.In the two sectors not examined here, professional service and
government, we see compelling evidence that unions are redirecting their
organizing energies successfully towards growing parts of the economy. The
analysis here focuses only on the private sector, and so does not treat, for
example, the growth of AFSCME to become the largest union within the AFL-CIO
today.
There are 110,200 CPS observations in Y74, and 104,700 in YSO. The Y80
sample is smaller because in 1981 the CPS only asked the union question to
that portion of the respondents who were leaving the revolving CPS sample.
The results reported here are basedon these weighted samples.
III. The ChangiriQ Locus of Unionization, 1973-1981
Only 22.4 percent of this weighted sample were reported as union members
in Y80. This is a 2.4 percentage point, or 10 percent decline from the 24.8
percent that were union members roughly six years previously in Y74. This 2.4-6-
percentage point drop during the late 1970's is striking when placed in
historical perspective, and marks a major decline in unions' fortunes. For
comparison, Dickens and Leonard report that between 1974 and 1980 the
proportion of private non-agricultural non-construction wage and salary
workers organized fell from 26.2 to 21.2, a 5.0 percentage point drop, or 34
percent of the 14.9 percentage point drop from the peak 36.1 percent organized
in 1954. Similarly, Pencavel and Hartsog report that between 1974 and 1950
the fraction of full-time equivalent employees represented by trade unions
fell from 27.2 to 23.8 (Table 1, p.5), a 3.4 percentage point drop, or 37
percent of the 9.3 percentage point drop from 33.1 percent represented in 1958
(the earliest year they report).
In contrast, Kokkelenberg and Sockell (K&S) (1975, Table 4, p. 533) using
three year moving averages of CPS data report that the percentage of workers
unionized rose slightly from 1974 (24.7 percent) to 1980 (25.0 percent). We
also report three year averages of CPS data for Y74 and Y80. K&S find a
slight (0.3 percentage point) increase where we finds a decline (2.4) because
they include the professional service and government sectors, although they
also note (p. 501) the change over time in the CPS question from union
membership to membership in a union or union-like employee association. This
undoubtedly accounts for a substantial part of the astounding 9 percentage
point increase in "unionization" that K&S observe (p. 501) among technical,
professional and kindred workers. With the exceptions of communications and
utilities, personal and professional service and public administration, K&S
find, as other researchers have, that unionization has declined across
industry.—7—
This decline in unionization has been a pervasive phenomenon. Table 1
shows that the percentage of the private workforce has declined since 1973
just about any way it is cut. In all the industries, occupations, regions,
age groups and sexes considered here the unionized proportion of the workforce
fell. This proportion even fell in some of the unions' strongholds: the
primary metals and automotive industries, and the mining and construction
sectors. Further disaggregation would do little to change this picture of
pervasive overall decline in unions' fortunes. The rays of hope for unions in
Table 1 are a nearly stable share of non-white workers and a slightly growing
share of college graduates.
Table 1 carries a simple but important lesson for those who would argue
that unions are in decline mainly because of structural changes that have
reduced employment in traditionally union intensive sectors. Since the
proportion unionized is falling within nearly every sector, the overall
proportion unionized would have fallen substantially even if the structure of
employment were frozen at 1974 levels.
IV. Framework for Structural Decomposition
All of the factors presented in the introduction have one thing is
COmmOn: Theyallexplain the decline in the aggregate percent unionized in
terms of a shift in the composition of the economy or the workforce from
sectors in which unions are strong to sectors in which unions are weak. They
all explain the decline of unions by reference to structural changes in the
composition of industry or the workforce.-8-
This lends itself to a mode of analysis that is straightforward, although
it may be difficult to operationalize. The aggregate proportion of the
workforce organized at time t 'isgivenby the identity:
(1) Ut =
where is the ratio of employment in sector i to total employment and
is the ratio of unionized workers to all workers in sector i. The change
over time in the proportion unionized isthengiven by:
+1 t t t
(2) U-U =E.[S.U.+U.S.+1LS.)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
t where U. =ut -U.,etc. Using this standard identify, the change in
aggregate proportion unionized can be divided into:
(1) within sector changes inproportionunionized,
(2) structural composition effects due to changes in the share of
employment across industries, and
(3) an interaction term.
Dividing equation (2) through by tU we get
L.S'AU. E.US. E.tU.tS.
(3) 1 =' 1+
1 1+
1 1 1
Weshall refer to these three terms as the within sector, composition, and
interaction effects respectively. The second term is structural change-9-
weighted by initial unionization. The sum of the last two terms is structural
change weighted by last period unionization.
The value added of this paper is in applying this decomposition
simultaneously and consistently to a number of the most prominent structural
explanations for the recent decline of unions. Previous work in this area
(reviewed in Section VII) examines structural change along fewer dimensions
and at a rougher level of aggregation. More important, they do not account
fully for interactions along different dimensions. The regressions typically
used in the past ignore such interactions, and so may either under— or
over-predict the importance of structural change along a given dimension. In
addition, past studies use the maintained assumption that unionization has
beer fixed over time within cells. Here, we allow explicitly for both within
and across cell changes, for their interaction, and for interactions along a
number of dimensions of structural change.
V.What Accounts for Union Decline in the 1970s?
The proportion of the workforce organized has been in continual decline
since 1954, and this decline accelerated during the 1970's. This section
measures the role played in explaining this recent decline by seven structural
factors: changes in region, industry, occupation, education, sex, race, and
age. The interaction of these seven factors is analyzed in Section VI.
Here we consider the impact of each factor in isolation.
Table 2 shows the results of seven separate one-variable simulations.
'The categories used in the seven simulationsare those shown in Table 1.For-10-
example, the first row of this table shows how much the unionized percent of
the workforce would have fallen if:
(1) the percent unionized within each industry (in Table 1) were held
fixed at 1974 levels while employment shares across industries shifted •in
their historical patterns,
(2) the distribution of employment across industries were held fixed as
in 1973, while within-industry percent union followed its historical pattern,
and
(3) only the interaction of changes in employment share and changes in
within sector unionization mattered.
All of the structural changes are less important than the within—sector
•changes. The shift in the workforce away from blue-collar and towards
white-collar work has been the single most important structural change, and
can itself account for 33 percent of the overall decline in unions. The other
important structural changes, and the share of the overall union decline each
can respectively explain (ignoring interactions) are: education (22 percent),
industry (12 percent), and gender (19 percent). The movement of employment to
the young plays only a minor role (9 percent) as does the shift to the South
and West (5 percent), and shifts in the race of the iorkforce are
inconsequential.
The third column of Table 2 shows a positive interaction effect in many
cases. On average the percent unions is falling within sectors, and
employment is shifting to low union sectors. Importantly, unionism is
decreasing where employment is decreasing. At the same time, unions are
making headway in some growing sectors, particularly in white-collar and—11—
clerical jobs, and among the highly educated.
VI. The Interact-ion of Structural ChanQes
Considered individually, structural changes each account for a
substantial portion of the decline in unions, but none of these changes have
occurred individually. Between 1974 and 1980 a larger fraction of the
workforce did move into sectors that have traditionally had low union-ction
such as the South and West, services, and white—collar work. If summed
together, these changes appear to explain a great deal of the declin€ -ft.
unionization. But by summing them, one would make the error of double (or
worse) counting, and so overstates the importance of structural changes.
Seven one-way decompositions will Count a job that moves from North to South,
from manufacturing to service, from blue-collar to white-collar, from old to
young, from high-school dropout to college graduate, from male to female and
from black to white seven times. The seven-way decomposition used in this
section counts this single change once.
We cross-tabulate employment and union membership across eight
industries, three occupations, three regions, two education levels, two age
groups, two races and just two sexes, for a total of 1152 cells. The
groupings, andthemarginal distribution of percent union are presented in
Table 1.
how much of the 2.4 percentage point decline in unionization can be
accounted for by structural changes? If the distribution of jobs across
sectorshad been frozen in 1974, we would expect the proportion unionized to—12-
fall to 23.8. In other words, the within-sector decline in the percent
unionized can account for 42 percent of the overall decline in unionism. We
could stop here and still have reached a very important conclusion regarding
the decline of unionism. Even if not a single job had moved to the South or
out of manufacturing, etc., unionization would still have fallen by 42 percent
of its actual decline.
The structural changes by themselves can account for 68 percent of the
decline n unionism. If the percent unionized within each sector were frozen
at its 1974 level, structural changes alone would reduce unionization to 23.1
percent in 1980. Together the within and between sector changes account for
over 100 of the change. The next section explains why.
The Interaction Effect: Declining Unionism in Declining Sectors
A new ingredient here is the interaction term, which has been missing
from previous analyses. It is true that employment share is growing in
low-union sectors and that on average the percent unionized is falling within
these sectors. But, the percent unionized is decreasing even more where
employment share in decreasing. The interaction of S and U is .0024, and
this positive interaction balances against both the negative composition, and
the negative within sector effects. In other words, unionism is declining in
most sectors ——enoughto account for 42 percent of the overall decline, and
employment is moving into low percent-union sectors --enoughto explain 68
percent of the drop in unionism. But where employment is declining, so is the
percent union, enough to undo 10 percent of the pure structural effect. In
other words, weighting by end period unionization, structural change can—13-
account for 58 percent of the union decline, and within sector declines can
account for 32 percent of total union decline. In a peculiar but not
inconsequential sense then, the decline in the percent unionized within many
of the traditionally union intensive sectors is of secondary importance
because these sectors are in decline themselves. The cause of this phenomenon
deserves further research.
Consideration of the interaction effect suggests and ambiguity in the
estimation of the amount of change which can be attributed to structural
factors and the amount of change taking place within sectors. Structural
change as given by equation (2) is simply:
(4) EU74S.
This weights the structural changes by initial period unionization in each
sector. Alternatively, one could weight by end period unionization, but this
is simply the sum of the above structural effect and of the interaction term:
(5) u!°s. =Eu4As.+EuiSi
Weighting by end of period unionization then, we find that structural change
can account for 58 percent of union decline. Similarly,
(6) ES!°aU. =Es74u.+
1 1 1 •I 1 1
Soweighting by end period structure, within sector declines can account for
32 percent of union decline.-14-
VII. Comparisons to Earlier Analyses
Are the structural changes we have observed here a new development
accelerating the decline in percent unionized in the late 70s and early 80s,
or are they rather just a continuation of past trends? For the period from
the mid-SOs to 1977, similar decompositions are reported by Henry Farber
(1985, Table 2.5, p.22). In simple one-way decompositions of the type
reported here, Farber's and our results for the percent of the decl'ne n
unionization accounted for by structural changes are given in Table 4. We
decompose in greater detail and along more dimensions than Farber, but for a
shorter period than the mid-50s to 1977 period that he analyzes. This
difference is important since the late70s and early 80s we concentrate on
hereare a period in which the decline of unions accelerat€-tl, and in
particular because the blame for this acceleration has often been placed or
the decline of manufacturing industries. Yet Farber's calculation of the
importance of this factor since the mid-SOs is larger than our analagous
calculation for the more recent period --.17compared to .12 of the union
declineaccounted for by industry shifts.It is by no means obvious from this
comparisonthat the restructuring of American industry has contributed to a
greater decline of unions recently than in the 60s or late 50s.If anything,
these results suggest the opposite. We also find a similarly diminished role
for shifts in the regional or gender distributon of the workforce in recent
years, compared to Farber. In contrast, we find that occupational shifts are
of greater importance in recent years. In addition, while Farber presents no
simple decompositions for age, race or education, we find the first two to be—15-
of negligible importance, while increases in educational levels are the second
most important single factor in accounting for the decline in percent
unionized.
The sum of Farber's individual shifts can account for 79 percent of the
overall decline in union density. As Farber notes, however, this is likely to
be an overstatement because of the correlation of changes along different
dimensions. To address this issue, a cross-section regression frorr the 1977
Quality of Employment Survey (Q.E.S.) is presented. This is a regression of
uflion status on dichotomous variables for race, sex, the South, manufacturing,
and clerical, service, professional and technical occupations. Using this
method and making the strong assumption that the propensity to unionize with
these groups has not changed between the mid-1950s and 1977, Farber concludes
that only about 41 percent of the drop in the extent of unionization can be
accounted for by gross shifts in the industry, occuptiLn, region and gender-
of the labor force. This is less than the 68 percent we calculate here using
a more detailed decomposition, more dimensions, and a different technique for
a more recent period.
Comparing Farber's regressions with his decomposition, we see that
changes in occupation, sex and industry are correlated with each other. The
importance of each of these factors is reduced in the regression that controls
for all of them at the same time. Comparing Farber's regression with our
decomposition, shifts in the occupational and gender distribution of the
workforce appear to have become more important recently. Recent industry
shifts appear either to have dominated Farber's results for the longer period,
or else to be a continuation of post—war trends in accounting for union decline.-16-
Richard Freeman and James Medoff (1984, p.225) report an analysis simi'ar
to that of Farber. In a pooled 1973-1975 May CPS sample, theycalculate
linear probability estimates of the probability of unionization as a function
of industry, occupation, region, gender, age, race and educatior!. They then
ask how changes in the distribution of employment across these classes,
holding the within class union propensity fixed, would be expected to change
the overall percent unionized, between 1954 and 1979. As Table 4 shows,the
Freeman and Medoff results, which are most directly comparable to Farber's
regression results, show a greater impact of industrial and occupational
shifts. Freeman and Medoff's results also imply that part of the effect we
find here for education is correlated with other factors, such as
occupation.
Comparing the three sets of findings, the greatest difference is between
Farber and the other two. Table 5 summarizes the proportion of union decline
that Carl be accounted for in total by each of the three studies. Weighting by
initial period unionization, we find that 68 percent of the decline of unions
can be accounted for by structural change. This is quite close toFreeman and
Medoff's 72 percent, for a longer period but with less disaggregation. These
two studies, using different techniques for different periods of time, arein
close agreement in finding that structural shifts in employment across
industries, occupations, regions and genders can account for the greater part
of the decline in the percent unionized. A comparison of the two studies
suggests that the period from 1973 to 1981 was not greatlydifferent from
the entire post 1954 period in the role played by structural shifts in
accounting for the decline in percent unionized.—17--
In contrast, Farber finds 41 percent of union decline attributable to
structural change. The greatest differences are found in the role attributed
to industry and occupation. This may be explained in part by differences in
populations studied. We eliminate workers in the government and professional
service industries. Most of these were government workers. Freeman and
Medoff's analysis is of all private sector workers, and so also excludes
government employees. The same is not true of Farber's analysis, which
includes government employees. Because the white—collar blue-collar
differential in union density -is much lower among government employees, it
stands to reason that Farber, by including government employees without
interaction terms, finds that occupational structure is less important.
Concerning the varying importance ascribed to industry, Farber's regression
divides employment into manufacturing, and non-manufacturing, while we use
eight industries and Freeman and Medoff use seven.
The interaction term we have calculated in this paper is not negligible,
and can also help explain the difference between Farber, and Freeman and
Medoff. We observe here that sectors with larger declines in shares of total
employment also tend to have started with high unionization and to exhibit
larger declines in percent unionized. Now consider two cross-section
regressions of union membership of a vector of dichotomous variables
representing industry, occupation, etc., estimated for two different years.
Because of the type of interaction observed here, the regression estimated in
the later year will tend to find smaller coefficients, and so less scope for
structural change. This is because in the sectors that have experienced the
greatest structural decline, the percent unionized has fallen (from the above-18-
mean) the greatest. This is why the positive interaction terms (largely the
product of two negatives) we observe here is important. In particular,
Freeman and Medoff's results hinge on a cross-section regression on 1973-75
data, while Farber's depend on a 1977 cross-section. In view of the
interaction effect, it is not entirely surprising that the analysis based or
the later cross-section finds smaller structural effects.
What our finding indicates is that if Farber had used an earlier year to
estimate his union density regreiori, he would have attributed more of the
change to structural factors. If Freeman and Medoff had used a later year,
they would have attributed less of the change to structural factors. As it
is, they estimate their regression using the same sample we use to construct
our base year estimates for union density. When we use those base year
estimates to compute the importance of structural change, we get results very
similar to theirs.
In a very different approach to examining the decline of unions, Dickens
and Leonard argued that fully 63 percent of the decline between 1950 and
1979 in the percent organized among private non-construction,
non-agricultural, wage and salary workers could be explained by the decline in
union organizing and success rates. A residual 35 percent was explained by
"economic factors," presumably differential employment growth rates in the
union and non—union sectors. In other words, one might read the Dickens and
Leonard results to argue that structural change could at most explain 35
percent of the union decline.
A key to reconciling our results might be to recognize that the changes
in organizing and success rates measured in O+L may be in part due to-19-
structural changes. We expect them to decline as unions' "natural territory"
declines. However, Freeman (1985, p. 50) reports that structural changes have
contributed only marginally to the decline in unions' success rate in NLRB
certification elections. Our results here then suggest that much of the
decline in union organizing rates previously observed may be due to structural
changes that reduced employment in sectors in which unions had historically
organized.
Dickens and Leonard also presented evidence suggesting that the
structural changes of the late 1970s were not out of line with previous
experience. In this light, our results here may be interpreted as the most
recent manifestation of an ongoing structural change since 1950.
Criticisms of the Structural Approach
The structural approach is limited. It can tell us where changes are
occurring, but it does not attempt to explain why they occurred. Three
examples will illustrate the limitations this imposes. First, structural
change is itself the product of larger economic forces. In particular, the
decline of total employment in some industries may itself be related to the
presence of unions. This would be accompanied by a declining unionization
rate within the affected industries --muchas we observe here --asunion
plants within the industry are particularly hard hit. Second, as mentioned
above, union organizing and success rates may themselves be endogenous to
structural change. Organizing and success rates may fall as union's
traditional territory contracts. Third, as Freeman and Medoff (1984, p.227)
point out, much the same structural changes we observe here for the U.S. have-20-
also taken place in Canada, but without the same consequent decline in
unionization.This serves as an important warning that other factors are at
work beyond those considered in structural models.
VIII. Conclusion
The period between 1973 and 1981 wanotso different from the previous
two decades concerning the importance of structural change in accounting f0r
thefate of unions, judging by a comparison of our results with earlier work
by Freeman and Medoff. These studies find that structural change can account
formorethanhalfbut less than three quarters of the decline in union
density. What does appear to set the 1970s apart from earlier periods is not
greater shifts in employment across industry lines, but rather greater shifts
across occupations, and greater changes in the education level and gender of
theworkforce.—21—
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Professional, Technical 13.5 13.4
Manager, Sales, Service 7.4 6.6
Craft, Operatives, Laborers 42.4 39.2
Industry
Mining, Construction, Stone 37.6 33.3
Ordinance, Fab. Metal, Aircraft 40.5 38.4
Other 11.6 10.3
Primary Metal, Auto 65.7 60.6
Machinery, Electronics 32.9 28.3
Food, Tobacco 42.5 40.1


















Note: V74 refers to grouped observations from the May CPS sample, in 1973,
1974 and 1975.
Y80 refers to grouped observations from the May CPS sample, in 1979,
1960 and 1981.Table 2
The Decline of Unions Y74-Y80
















—.30 12.3 —2.14 88.1 .036 -1.5
Occupation
—.81 33.3 -1.70 70.0 .076 —3.1
Region -.12 4.9 -2.30 94.7 -.0022 0.09
Age -.22 9.1 -2.22 91.4 -.024 1.0
Education -.54 22.2 -1.99 81.9 .177 —7.3
Race .03 -1.2 -2.47 101.6 .013 -0.5
Sex —.45 18.5 -2.03 83.5 .045 —1.8
Note: These are compared with a decline in aggregate unionization from 24.79
percent in 1974 to 22.36 percent in 1980, or -2.43. Y74 refers to
grouped observations from the May CPS samples in 1973, 1974, and 1975.
Y80 refers to grouped observations from 1979, 1980, and 1981.Table 3
Summary of Seven-Way Cross-Tabulation of Structural Changes
and the Decline of Unions, Y74-YSO
N =1152Cells
Proportion of
Impact on Union Decline
Union Density Accounted For
1152
74
1. Within Cell -.0102 .42
1152
74
2. Across Cell EU,S1 -.0165 .68
.i=1
1152
3. Interaction ZS,U1 .0024 —.10
1=1
Note:Cell categories are given in Table 1.Table 4
Structural Explanations for the Decline of Unions
Study:
Proportion of UnionDecline Accounted For
Leonard
Dickens
& Farber Farber Freeman &
Medoff
Period: 1973-81 Mid—50s-77 Mid—50s-77 1954—79









Industry .12 .17 .10 .17
Occupation .33 .21 .12 .25
Region .05 .12 .12 .12
Sex .19 .24 .05 .07
Education .22 -- -- .06
Race -.01 -- -- .00
Age .09 -- -- .04
Sources: R. Freeman and J. Medoff (1984, p. 225, Table 15.2)
H. Farber, (1985, p. 22, Table 2.5).Table 5
Total Structural Proportion of Union Decline
1. Leonard & Dickens
1973-8 1
cPs .58 to .68





3. Fr'eenan & Medoff
1954—79
1973—75CPS .72
Regression